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imposition of extensive liability upon defendants but could lead to
such liability without directly confronting the prospect of liquidating
the corporate defendant to pay judgment creditors. 37

IV.

THE TENDER OFFER -

A DEVELOPING

CONCEPT
When Congress passed the Williams Act' amendments to the Securities Exchange Act the tender offer was for the first time subjected
to federal regulation under the securities laws.2 Although the term
"tender offer" has a meaning based on generally understood custom
and usage,3 Congress did not define the term within the Act,4 apparculpability requisite for liability under Rule 10b-5. See text accompanying notes 1213 at 752-53.
" The recent Second Circuit decision in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), indicates that one court has perhaps reached this
point under the tender offer anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.
Damages of $25,793,365 and prejudgement interest amounting to $10,000,000 were
awarded Chris-Craft. Bangor-Punta Corporation, one of the defendants in the case
with sufficient assets to pay the award, has claimed that the award and interest
amount to 37% of shareholder equity and 52% of working capital. A rehearing en banc
was denied by the Second Circuit, 516 F.2d at 172, and the Supreme Court will be
petitioned to grant certiorari. Petitioner's Brief for Ceitiorari, Bangor Punta Corp. v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. (undocketed).
I Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. §§
78m-n (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (Supp. V, 1965-69)), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1970).
2 During the 1960's the cash tender offer became a popular means of acquiring
control of a corporation. One of the prime advantages of the tender offer was the
absence of federal controls which regulated other means of gaining corporate control
such as proxy contests, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1970); SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 103 (1974), and exchange offers,
Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5-8, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-h, j (1970). See generallyE. AnANow
& H. ENHoRN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 64-76 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as ARANOw & EINHORN]; Fleisher & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender
Offer, 115 U. PA. L. Rv. 317, 317-21 (1967); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender
Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250, 1253-54
(1973) [hereinafter cited as The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer"].
Traditionally "tender offer" has meant a public offer by an individual or group
to purchase a specified number of a class or classes of securities of a public corporation.
See, e.g., ARANow & EINHORN, supra note 2, at 69-70; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURIIEs REGULATION 936-37 (3d ed. 1972); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv. L. REv. 377,
377-78 (1969). The offer remains open for a stated period of time and the specified price
remains constant, usually 10 - 20% above the current market price. See, e.g., Hayes &
Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, HARv. Bus. REv. Mar-Apr. 1967 at 135; Comment, Tender Offers: An Analysis of the Early Development of Standing to Sue Under
Section 14(e), 5 TEx. TECH L. REv. 779, 783 (1974). The obligation of the offeror to
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ently to "prserve the flexibility of both the Commission and the
courts in making a determination on a case-by-case basis."5 While
most decisions have adhered to the traditional meaning in applying
the provisions of the Williams Act,' several cases decided in 1974
indicated a willingness to apply a more flexible definition of "tender
offer." 7
The open market purchase of shares of a corporation has not traditionally been considered a tender offer.' No public offer to purchase
purchase is usually contingent upon a tendering of the requisite number of shares, and
if more than enough shares are tendered the offeror must accept the tenders on a pro
rata basis. Exchange Act § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1970). See also A~lAow &
EINHORN, supra note 2, at 48-50.
The American Law Institute has proposed a narrow definition of "tender request"
generally following the traditional definition:
Sec. 299.9 [Tender request] (a) [General] "Tender request" means
an offer to buy a security, or a solicitation of an offer to sell a security,
that is directed to more than thirty-five persons, unless it (1) is incidental to the execution of a buy order by a broker or dealer in a trading
transaction [or a transaction by or for the account or benefit of the
issuer] and (2) satisfies any additional conditions that the Commission imposes by rule.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 299.9(a) (Apr. 1972 Draft). In Comment 2 to § 299.9(a) the
Drafters point out that while the tender request and the traditional tender offer are
the same device, "tender request" is a more appropriate term since the offeror is
requesting the shareholders to tender their shares to him.
1 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970).
5 ARANOW & ENHoRN, supra note 2, at 70.
'See, e.g., Gulf & Western Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066,
1074 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (market purchases, even though
made in anticipation of a tender offer do not constitute part of the tender offer); D-Z
Inv. Co. v. Holloway, CCH FED. SEC.-L. REP. 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1974)
(activities involved do not constitute a conventional tender offer and there is no authority for extending traditional definition).
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
873 (1974) (tender offer is to apply to cases where there is a danger the investor might
be misled); Loews Corp. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 74 C 1396 (N.D. 111. July
11, 1974) (certain activities may constitute a tender offer to the extent they go beyond
"anything other than open market purchases"); ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes
Land Trust, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,585 (S.D.N.Y.
June 6, 1974) (statements made in anticipation of tender offer constitute part of the
tender offer); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,455 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1973) (meaning of tender offer should extend
to all purchases pressuring the investor into a hasty, uninformed decision to sell).
I See, e.g., Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,943 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 1973);
Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973). See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 299.9 (Apr.
1972 Draft) (Comment).
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is made, no deadline for tender is required, and the offeror retains no
option to abrogate the purchase once made. This threefold aspect of
the traditional tender offer was reaffirmed by the Southern District
of New York in D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway? In April 1974, D-Z
Investment Co. began buying shares of NJB Prime Investors on the
open market in an attempt to gain control of NJB, and subsequently
purchased a large number of NJB shares by means of four privately
negotiated transactions. D-Z sought an injunction against certain
defensive activities of NJB and NJB counterclaimed, alleging inter
alia that the activities of D-Z constituted a tender offer under the
Williams Act and that the failure of D-Z to file the statements required by Rules 14d-1 and 14d-41° constituted violations of § 14(d)
and § 14(e) of the Exchange Act. While the court recognized the
expanding scope of the term "tender offer,"" it stated unequivocally
that the challenged purchases contained none of the characteristics
of a conventional tender offer and that no judicial authority existed*
in the Second Circuit to extend the term beyond its normal mean2
ing.'
In contrast to the court's orthodox definition of tender offer in DZ Investment, language in other cases evidences a willingness to ex3
pand the traditional definition under appropriate circumstances.'
Some courts have become increasingly cognizant of the impact on the
individual shareholder of major stock acquisitions and large block
purchases and have endeavored to protect the shareholder from pressures which might precipitate a hurried and ill-advised disposition of
his holdings." The court in Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc.1 stated
I CCH

FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1974).
,0Rule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1974), requires the filing by the offeror of
Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1974), if after consummation of the tender offer
the offeror would be the beneficial owner of more than 5% of the class of security
solicited. Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1974). This schedule requires information
including the class of security solicited and the identity and background of the offeror.
11CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,771, at 96,562-63.
,2Id. at 96,562.
,3See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 598 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, vacated
per stipulation, Civ. No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972).
" See, e.g., Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, vacated per
stipulation, Civ. No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972). The court in Cattlemen's
Investment held that a coordinated series of purchases from several large shareholders
was a tender offer under § 14(d). Although recognizing that such a series of transactions would not be considered a tender offer within the conventional definition, the
court reasoned that they created the same type of pressures on the investor that
Congress attempted to alleviate by § 14(d) of the Williams Act. Id. at 1251-52. See also
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that the definition of tender offer "should extend beyond its conventional meaning to offers likely to pressure shareholders into making
uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell."'" In the Nachman case,
Halfred purchased a thirty percent block of Nachman sto'ck from
Tech Tape, Inc.17 In an attempt to gain a voice in management,

Halfred made both open market purchases, and privately negotiated
purchases from holders of large blocks of Nachman stock. Nachman
sought a preliminary injunction alleging that Halfred's actions constituted a tender offer and that he failed to comply with the requirements of the Williams Act. While recognizing the need for a flexible
definition of the term tender offer, the court reasoned that the shareholders contacted by Halfred were "presumed to be powerful enough
not to be pressured.

. .

into making uninformed, ill-considered deci-

sions to sell."18
Although the courts in neither of these cases concluded that the
challenged activities constituted a tender offer, the decisions illustrate the current judicial inclination, in defining tender offer, to supplement the traditional analysis of the offeror's activity 9 with an
analysis of the coercive effect the activity has on the individual investor.n2 In both Nachman and D-Z Investment the court focused on the
The Development Meaning of "Tender Offer," supra note 2. The author suggests
extension of the term tender offer to encompass all situations which create investor
pressure to make a hurried decision to buy or sell similar to that found in the conventional tender offer.
,1 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,455 (N.D. Ill. July
13, 1973).
Is Id. at 95,590.
17Id.
11 Id. at 95,592. See also ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 299.9 (Apr. 1972 Draft) (Comment).
The drafters suggest that the Williams Act was not designed to cover transactions
involving a few controlling shareholders.
"

See note 3 supra.

See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974). That case involved a merger of two corporations. The plaintiff, a
shareholder of the acquired corporation, alleged that a letter from the surviving corporation to the merging corporation's shareholders constituted a tender offer. However,
the defendant contended that a tender offer required hostility between the offeror and
the target company. Judge Wisdom, speaking for the court, stated that although the
primary practice Congress sought to regulate was the corporate takeover, the aim of
the Williams Act was to protect the investor. Judge Wisdom reasoned that investors
would require greater protection when management of the target company and management of the offeror company "are on the same side of the fence," as in this case.
Id. at 598. In conclusion, Judge Wisdom indicated that the term tender offer should
be developed on a case-by-case basis with the basic investor protection purposes of the
securities laws in mind. Id.
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specific facts and the sophistication of the investors involved. In
Nachman the investors were large shareholders or directors of the
target corporation. Although'the tactics used by Halfred may have
intimidated some investors, the court reasoned that because of their
power and position the investors involved in Nachman were not susceptible to such pressures. 2 In D-Z Investment the court declined to
extend the conventional definition of tender offer, but emphasized
that even under the expanded definition .the private transactions
involved "financial institutions" and "sophisticated persons" who
were able to fend for themselves.2
While no court has held an open market purchase to be subject
to the tender offer provisions of the Exchange Act, the "investor
pressure" theory used by the court in Nachman may, if widely
adopted, subject open market purchases as well as privately negotiated purchases to the filing requirements of § 14(d) and the antifraud
provisions of § 14(e).2 The ordinary market purchase does not involve
the pressure of the traditional tender offer. However, if a purchase is
preceded by publicity, or investors are notified in advance of a large
purchase, the pressure on the shareholder to make a hurried decision
may be sufficient to regard such a transaction as a tender offer under
the "investor pressure" formula.Y Similarly, when large private purchases are accompanied by publicity, the coercive impact on the
individual shareholder may be strong enough to bring the activity
within the "investor pressure" definition. Although not universally
accepted, the growing tendency of the courts to apply the "investor
pressure" formula could extend the tender offer filing requirements
to many activities not heretofore considered tender offers. 25
21[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH. FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,455, at 95,592 (N.D.
Ill.
July 13, 1973).
2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,771, at 96,563 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1974).
' In LSL Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. RaP. T 79,715
(SEC Staff Reply Jan. 8, 1974), the Division of Corporate Finance refused to express
an opinion about whether LSL's intent to increase its holding of Progressive National
Corp. from 30% to 51% through open market purchases and private negotiations would
constitute a tender offer. The staff was apparently leaving open the possibility that
open market purchases might be considered a tender offer if combined with other
systematic acquisitions of stock.
2 See The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer," supra note 2, at 1279.
25 The Commission has recently undertaken a study to determine whether it
should define tender offer; and, if so, whether the definition should include: (a) open
market purchases; (b) offers or invitations to a limited number of persons; (c) privately
negotiated transactions. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11003 (Sept. 9,
1974).

